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ABSTRACT 
 
Regulatory, environmental, and market changes are spurring new technological development in 
the energy industry.  Fuel cells are the largest new entrant to the energy industry, and this 
technology faces enormous challenges in entering the transportation and power generation 
markets.  Potential barriers include slow market acceptance, the resistance of incumbent energy 
firms, the lack of hydrogen infrastructure systems, and significant design and engineering 
obstacles.  This paper compares challenges faced by the fuel cell industry to those faced by 
several previous breakthrough energy technologies – including incandescent light bulbs, 
fluorescent light bulbs, and combustion turbines – all of which faced comparable market entry 
challenges before ultimately succeeding.  Results of this study and historical comparison show 
how other energy companies and industries overcame similar and daunting barriers.  Lessons 
from these earlier success stories include the need for critical enablers such as using niche 
markets to sustain R&D, building new infrastructure systems or conforming to existing ones, and 
benefiting from favorable public policies.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
s the energy industry transitions to more environmentally-friendly technologies, new market 
entrants can learn a great deal from earlier generations of energy technologies.  This paper 
examines the market entry challenges of a series of different energy technologies, then uses those 
findings to suggest lessons for one of the latest market entrants: companies in the fuel cell industry.   
 
Although fuel cells hold some advantages over rival clean energy technologies, the fuel cell industry faces 
major economic, technological, and market challenges (Edwards, et. al., 2008).  Fuel cell advantages include 
environmentally benign emissions, high reliability because no moving parts are necessary, and steadily increasing 
economic competitiveness.  Despite these advantages, fuel cells face many technical obstacles and the fuel cell 
industry faces significant market entry barriers.  Some of these major obstacles include the high cost of fuel cell 
components, insufficient power densities, the lack of hydrogen infrastructure or distribution systems, slow market 
acceptance, and resistance from incumbent companies with established technologies (Schoots, et al., 2010).  These 
are daunting technology management challenges.    
 
Inspiration can be found in other energy technologies that are now common, yet were once in similarly 
precarious positions: incandescent light bulbs, fluorescent light bulbs, and combustion turbines.  The successful 
market entries of these technologies are now known, but their successes were not foregone conclusions during their 
infancies.  These other technologies initially faced similar hurdles, including expensive components, inferior 
performance, high costs, and resistance from market leaders.  They finally gained market entry because of critical 
enablers for which the fuel industry must find parallels.  In the past, those enablers included establishments of 
networks, improved technologies, and the establishment of standards or favorable policies.  The fuel cell industry 
may achieve success through similar means.    
A 
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BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The fuel cell industry has grown over the past decade to become an almost $1.1 billion industry, including 
about $416 million in revenue and $800 million on research and development (R&D) annually (National Research 
Council, 2008; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2007; Wilhelm, 2001).  Forecasts suggest growth to a $60 billion market 
by 2018, although some estimates are higher if they include auxiliary equipment and sectors (Chung, 2008).  These 
auxiliary sectors are important because many fuel cells still require the use of expensive materials, such as platinum 
or patented chemicals for anodes and proton-exchange membranes.  These specialized materials are necessary for 
fuel cells to cleanly convert hydrogen into electricity for power generation or motive power for automobiles. 
   
Fuel cells were experimentally developed in 1839 and named in 1889, but remained both expensive and 
obscure until GE developed the first proton exchange membrane in 1955 and NASA began using fuel cells to power 
electronics for the Gemini and Apollo space programs in the 1960 and 1970s (Sorenesen, 2005).  Fuel cells now 
have niche commercial applications in the power generation industry and experimental applications in the 
transportation industry, where they are considered environmentally friendly because of their low emissions (Hendry 
et al., 2010; Peters and Coles, 2010).  Fuel cells are no longer obscure, but they are still expensive.  For example, 
fuel cell cogeneration plants cost about $3000/kW, about 2 to 9 times more expensive than equivalent nuclear or 
coal-fired generators; they therefore tend to be cost-effective only in special circumstances (De Almeida, et al., 
2008, Werner, 2007; Unger, 2001).  Costs are expected to drop with larger scale production, but more significant 
cost reductions are necessary to achieve competitiveness.   
 
Previous research on the fuel cell industry points to both its strengths and weaknesses. Advocates claim that 
the society will inevitably shift from fossil fuel consumption to a hydrogen-based economy with fuel-cell cars and 
power plants. For example, Cook (2002) argues that, just as steam engines dominated the 19
th
 century and internal 
combustion dominated the 20
th
 century, so fuel cells will dominate the 21
st
 century.  Some prior research examines 
expanding hydrogen and fuel cell infrastructures in other countries (Zhang and Cooke, 2010; Vasudeva, 2009).  
Other sources focus on technological improvements that make fuel cell success more likely, including cost 
reductions in proton exchange membranes and increased energy densities (Sorensen, 2005; Fernandes and Ticianelli, 
2009).  Several sources consider fuel cells to be a disruptive technology likely to succeed in ways unexpected by 
incumbent firms (Christensen and Raynor, 2003, Harborne et al., 2009).  In contrast, others suggest that fuel cell 
obstacles are still too high and that other technologies are likely to maintain their dominance (Romm, 2006; Ross, 
2006). These authors point to the high costs of fuel cells and hydrogen distribution as reasons why other energy 
options are more favorable.   
 
Another market entry barrier for the fuel cell industry is the chicken-and-egg problem of fuel production 
and distribution.  For example, auto manufacturers will not invest heavily in fuel cell cars if there are no hydrogen 
refueling stations for customers (Senor and Singer, 2009).  Meanwhile, energy companies have little incentive to 
provide hydrogen refueling stations unless there is a critical mass of fuel cell vehicles on the road.  The lack of a 
hydrogen infrastructure and consumer unfamiliarity with hydrogen fuel remain significant obstacles (Ricci et al., 
2007). Further, while most countries have methods of transporting or distributing oil, gasoline, or natural gas, 
creating a hydrogen system would require enormous investment.  Establishing a hydrogen fuel infrastructure would 
cost hundreds of billions of dollars, or $100-$600 per car fueled, which is beyond the means of many energy 
companies, although perhaps achievable with devoted government funds (McCarthy et al. 2007; Ogden et al., 1999; 
Macleod, 2008).  
 
Fuel cells have great potential but technology challenges, lack of infrastructure, and other market entry 
barriers make their future uncertain.  The remainder of this paper draws lessons from other technologies that faced 
similarly uncertain futures during their introductions.   
 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE ANALYSIS OF THREE TECHNOLOGIES 
 
In order to view fuel cell market entry challenges in the context of history, it is useful to make comparisons 
to dissimilar technologies in the same energy industry.  This research examines the emergence of three different 
energy technologies: combustion turbines, incandescent light bulbs, and fluorescent light bulbs.  For each case, this 
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section discusses the technology’s invention and commercialization, its historical progress, its market entry barriers, 
and how they were overcome. 
 
To incorporate both supply and demand, the industries used in this comparison included both the power 
generation and power consumption sides of the energy industry. Combustion turbines proved to be a good basis for 
comparison because they perform a power generation function similar to fuel cells (although in a technologically 
different way) and underwent years of development and doubt before finally penetrating the power generation 
market.  The lighting industry provided the other two bases of comparison because it consumes 20-25% of all U.S. 
generated power and represents the other end of the energy spectrum.  Each industry case study was conducted using 
a combination of data from historians, company sales records, and public or government data on energy use and 
market entry.   
 
Incandescent Light Bulbs 
 
Although ubiquitous today, the incandescent light bulbs that Thomas Edison patented in 1880 were initially 
inferior to the gas lamps that he hoped to supplant.  Despite over 50 years of experimentation and iteration by 
Edison and previous inventors, the light quality and reliability of incandescent bulbs were poor.  Because early 
filament materials were incapable of illuminating brightly without burning, material experimentation was critical.  
Developmental bulbs were also vacuum-sealed to prevent filament combustion.  Modern incandescent bulbs, with 
tungsten filaments, low-pressure inert gasses, and long lives were still decades away.   
  
Incandescent bulbs faced further competitive disadvantage because they required an electric infrastructure 
that did not yet exist.  In contrast, the gas lamp industry relied on a strong gas distribution system that delivered 
natural gas to streetlights and structures.  Gas lamps, which started appearing on city streets 50 years before 
Edison’s patent, helped to establish and entrench gas companies with strong interests in preserving their markets.  
Gas companies were deeply entrenched in both the political and physical infrastructure of major cities (Hargadon, 
2004). 
 
For incandescent bulbs to displace the incumbent gas industry, they had to overcome both the technical and 
market challenges presented above.  Several counterintuitive methods were used in market entry, including mimicry 
of existing conditions, creation of a network, and seeking investment from entrenched competitors.  Mimicry of 
market conditions was necessary because Edison felt that early adopters would more readily accept electric light 
bulbs if they were similar to gas lamps.  He therefore offered relatively dim, 12-watt bulbs that emitted 
approximately the same number of lumens as gas lamps, even though he could easily manufacture 40-watt bulbs.  
To create a network, Edison created the Pearl Street Station power plant and an electric network of several square 
blocks to serve as an initial market.  This creation of an entire network was expensive and required investors, and 
Edison went so far as to seek investment from traditional gas company investors such as J.P. Morgan (Hargadon, 
2004; Alexis, 2002).   
 
Incandescent light bulbs were not instantly successful.  They had existed for almost 40 years before Edison 
made his technical improvements and market introduction in the 1880s.  With Edison’s improvements and the 
creation of small electric grid islands with power generation facilities, the incandescent bulbs came to occupy niches 
in the lighting market.  The 1911 introduction of an inexpensive method of manufacturing tungsten filaments, which 
both reduced bulb prices and increased bulb lifetimes, helped secure further market adoption.  By 1930, almost 70% 
of U.S. households had electric service for lighting, marking the growing triumph of the electricity infrastructure and 
incandescent bulbs (Hall & Kahn, 2002; Nye, 1990).   
 
Fluorescent Light Bulbs 
 
Fluorescent light bulbs use the same network as their incandescent predecessors, yet they are more 
efficient, have no filaments and create light using an entirely different technology.  Although versions of these 
gaseous bulbs appeared in the mid 1800s, they created distinct light colors (often red or blue) depending on the gas 
used.  They did not become practical until 1926, when Edmond Germer invented modern phosphor-coated bulbs, 
and finally entered wide commercial use in 1938, after G.E. bought the patent.  Compact fluorescent bulbs have 
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entered the residential lighting market in the past decade by mimicking the shape and outlet connections of 
traditional incandescent bulbs.   
 
Market barriers to entry for fluorescent bulbs include high purchase costs, slow consumer acceptance of 
white lighting, and the special challenges of light ballasts.  Costs are the most deceiving of these barriers because the 
operating costs of fluorescent bulbs are lower than their incandescent equivalents, while their manufacturing or 
purchase costs are about 4-8 times higher per lifetime hour (Johnson, 2007; USDOE, 2007).  In order to have an 
economic incentive to use high-efficiency bulbs, purchasers must have the capital available for the initial purchases 
and be the same agents who pay for the operating electricity.  Then, the payback periods for the high-priced bulbs 
are 1.1-2.5 years of average use, depending on the bulb wattage and cost of electricity (USDOE, 1996).   
 
Consumer and social acceptance of fluorescent bulbs depends on the ease of bulb use and the quality of 
light.  For their first 50 years, fluorescent bulbs were large tubes that required ballasts on each end.  Although they 
used standard electricity, they were incompatible with conventional sockets because of ballast requirements.  This 
incompatibility with home light socket standards dissuaded individuals and residential buyers from purchasing 
fluorescent bulbs.  Furthermore, most consumers prefer yellow or broad-spectrum lights rather than pale white 
fluorescent lights (Kolanowski, 1989; McShane, 1997). 
 
 Four main factors are enabling florescent bulbs to overcome the market barriers described above.  First, 
compact fluorescent bulbs are 75-50% more efficient than their incandescent counterparts.  Second, technology 
improvements have allowed manufacturers to change light hues by either making broad-spectrum bulbs or by 
including color-correcting filters.  Third, the introduction of compact fluorescent bulbs coincided with ballasts that 
were compatible with standard light bulb sockets.  Fourth, consumers are encouraged to become new technology 
adopters by both commercial and policy campaigns.  Commercial campaigns include manufacturer Siemens’ rebates 
and retailer Wal-Mart’s marketing campaign of in-store demonstrations used to influence customer selection 
(Abboud, 2006; Barbaro, 2007).  Policy campaigns include Australian and European Union efficiency regulations 
that effectively ban most incandescent bulbs and US regulations that will phase out most incandescent bulbs by 2012 
(Kanter, 2009; Waide, 2010). 
 
As a result of these economic, technological, and social enablers, compact fluorescent bulbs are now 
enjoying significant market penetration.  Their sales increased from negligible levels in 1995 to a peak of almost 397 
million bulbs in the U.S. in 2007 (Lifsher and Uribarri, 2007; USDOE, 2009) Although sales slumped during the 
recent recession, demand remains strong and some major manufacturers such as Philips have announced plans to 
stop manufacturing incandescent bulbs by 2016 in anticipation of more energy-efficient fluorescent bulbs (Daley, 
2008; Karney, 2009).   
 
Combustion Turbines 
 
Combustion turbines represent another energy technology that emerged to capture a significant new share 
in an existing market.  Traditional steam turbines, which still generate the majority of the world’s electricity, operate 
by using fuel in boilers to create steam that circulates around the turbine blades.  The rotating blades then turn a 
generator to create electric power.  Combustion turbines operate using an entirely different thermodynamic cycle – 
and often a different fuel as well.  Combustion turbines generally burn either natural gas or oil inside the turbines 
themselves to create rotational energy.  In this sense, they are like jet engines, except that they produce electrical 
power instead of thrust. 
 
The first combustion turbine patent was issued to John Barber in 1791, but early versions were not 
commercialized because the energy needed to compress burning gas into the engines far outweighed the power 
generated by the turbines themselves.  Practical machines would also require much higher operating temperatures 
and needed materials that were not yet available.  Combustion turbines made their real debut during World War II, 
when the military need for jet engines combined with massive government R&D subsidies.  The Lend-Lease 
agreement transferred early British designs to American companies and turned the design recipients (GE and Pratt & 
Whitney) into market leaders in the military aircraft industry (Unger, 2001). 
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Combustion turbines were unable to enter the power generation market after the war because their 
efficiencies were still far lower than their steam turbine counterparts.  Their major barriers to entry were technical: 
efficiency improvements required operating temperatures too high for most metals to withstand.  A second barrier to 
entry was the dominance of coal.  The U.S. had a strong coal infrastructure in which coal was plentiful, inexpensive, 
and easily transportable by the existing rail infrastructure.  In contrast, the oil or natural gas necessary to fuel 
combustion turbines were both more expensive and lacked a pipeline system for easy transport.    
 
Manufacturers were able to overcome these market barriers by sustaining R&D through niche markets for 
several decades until a convergence of three forces enabled significant market entry.  First, niche markets such as 
military aircraft engines in the 1950s and then commercial aircraft engines in the 1960s allowed manufacturers to 
improve their designs and raise the operating temperatures (and therefore efficiencies) of combustion turbines.  
Major improvements included the introduction of cobalt metal alloys and cooling systems that allowed turbine 
efficiencies to increase by almost 50% between 1945 and 1967 (Bannister et al. 1996). 
 
A second niche market opened in 1965, when a major U.S. blackout prompted utility companies to seek 
small, surplus electricity generators for emergencies or peak power periods.  Manufacturers redesigned combustion 
turbines for ground-based power.  Steam turbines still shouldered the base generation load, but demand for 
combustion turbines skyrocketed.  Within one decade, over 40 million kW of capacity were installed in the U.S., and 
manufacturers like GE, Westinghouse, and Brown-Boveri (later ABB) continued to make technological 
improvements. 
 
Combustion turbines were still unable to penetrate the main power generation market until the 1990s, when 
three forces finally converged to enable their success in the U.S.  First, the operating costs of combustion turbines 
decreased because the government rescinded natural gas policies (including the Power Plant and Industrial Fuel Use 
Act of 1978) that had previously limited industrial gas consumption and kept natural gas prices high (Zinc 1996).  
Second, environmental regulations increased the operating costs of coal-fired steam turbine plants, to the advantage 
of natural gas-fired combustion turbines, which emit considerably fewer pollutants.  Finally, electric market 
restructuring created a market incentive for smaller power plants with lower capital costs, faster construction times, 
and shorter payback periods  (Unger, 2001).  Thus, after nearly 40 years of technological improvements enabled by 
niche sales in the aircraft engine and peak power industry, these three forces converged to allow the turbine market 
to grow.  As a result, deliveries rose dramatically near the turn of the century and combustion turbines came to 
dominate U.S. plant capacity additions (USDOE, 1995). 
 
RESULTS  
 
The incandescent, fluorescent, and combustion turbine case studies share important similarities.  All three 
products successfully entered their markets after decades of invention and refinement. Incandescent bulbs and 
combustion turbines are unqualified success stories; they are now established products affecting the lives of billions 
of people.  Fluorescent bulbs constitute a qualified success story; ordinary fluorescent bulbs were successful in 
industrial markets, but were not strong in residential lighting markets until recently. 
 
Fuel cells are still nascent compared to light bulbs and turbines, yet they face challenges similar to those 
overcome by older energy technologies.  A comparison and contrast of some key market entry barriers and 
conditions are listed below in Table 1.    
 
The market entry barriers in the left column of Table 1 correspond with those discussed in the earlier case 
analysis.  Some rows reveal important differences.  For example, the first row indicates that incumbent firms played 
different roles, depending on the technology.  Incumbent firms developed fluorescent bulbs and combustion 
turbines, but new entrants played a larger role in developing fuel cells.  The second row indicates that although all 
new entrants needed infrastructure, fluorescent lights had the benefit of a preexisting electric distribution system, 
whereas combustion turbines required expansion of a gas pipeline system.  The last row indicates that 
standardization was more important for incandescent and fluorescent bulbs – whose designs were limited by the 
need to have them fit in common sockets or ballasts – than it was for turbines or fuel cells, which need only produce 
AC electricity but can do so though multiple potential designs.   
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Table 1: Comparison of Market Entry Barriers across Different Energy Technology Products 
                           Case 
Market                 study 
entry barrier 
Incandescent bulbs Fluorescent bulbs 
Combustion 
turbines 
Fuel Cells 
Role of incumbent firms 
Developed 
independently, 
opposed by rival, 
entrenched gas 
companies  
Manufactured by 
incumbent 
incandescent bulb 
firms (incl. GE, 
Philips, Sylvania) 
Developed mainly by 
incumbent firms 
(GE, ABB, 
Westinghouse)  
Developed 
independently, 
opposed by direct 
rivals 
Need for new 
infrastructure 
Yes, electric 
infrastructure 
nonexistent 
Electric 
infrastructure pre-
established, but 
ballasts were 
required 
Gas pipeline 
infrastructure 
established as 
turbines developed 
Yes, hydrogen 
infrastructure 
nonexistent 
Need for cost reduction Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Need for technological 
improvement 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Need for favorable policy 
changes 
Yes No Yes Likely yes 
Adoption time Decades Decades Decades Likely decades 
Need for niche market to 
sustain development 
Yes, public 
events/festivals and 
areas with early 
electric 
infrastructures served 
as test markets 
Yes, niche markets 
included industrial 
lighting until 
compact fluorescents 
were introduced for 
residential use  
Yes, niche markets 
included aircraft 
engine and 
emergency power 
markets 
Yes, niche markets 
include space 
programs and 
distributed 
generation 
Standardization Yes – sockets 
Yes – ballasts and 
sockets 
No – only standard 
output 
No – only standard 
output 
 
 
Some rows in Figure 1 reveal important similarities.  For example, the 3
rd
 row illustrates that all new 
technologies in this field required lower production costs in order to achieve market entry.  Although high 
production costs served as a universal barrier to market entry in this field, they do not necessarily play the same role 
in other industries.  In many common consumer goods, for example, a new product may be produced as 
inexpensively as an existing product.   
 
Another similarity among the four technologies in Figure 1 is the need for a niche market to sustain the 
nascent innovation until improvements allow for greater market acceptance.  Other similarities include the need for 
technological improvement and the significant length of time for market adoption. 
 
DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED  
 
This study demonstrates some compelling similarities among the market entry challenges faced by several 
energy technologies.  It suggests that the market entry of incandescent light bulbs, fluorescent light bulbs, and 
combustion turbines can serve as potential guides for the fuel cell industry. 
 
Table 1 demonstrated how both fuel cells and incandescent light bulbs required infrastructure development 
to succeed.  Indeed, if fuel cells succeed, the creation of a hydrogen manufacturing and distribution system may 
closely resemble the creation of electric power plants and transmission wires in the 20
th
 century.  However, unlike 
the case for light bulbs, where Edison himself was able to finance and build early electrical grids, fuel cell 
manufacturers are not positioned to provide the hydrogen network that fuel cells need for successful market entry.  
The problem cannot be ignored; both the fluorescent lights and combustion turbine models also display the need for 
infrastructure to precede market expansion.  In the case of fuel cells, significant investments will be necessary from 
governments, energy companies, or consortia.  
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The fuel cell industry can also learn lessons from the role that incumbent companies play in the 
introduction of new energy technologies.  In the case of light bulbs, rival gas companies had no interest in the new 
and rival technology, despite Edison’s efforts to woo their investment.  Because Edison was able to finance an 
electricity network without the gas industry, entrenched incumbents were swept away.  In contrast, when fluorescent 
bulbs were invented, GE (originally founded by Edison) considered the new technology to be a potential threat and 
purchased the patent rights so that the company could manufacture fluorescent bulbs itself.  It profited from selling 
fluorescent bulbs, but was not eager to see long-lasting fluorescent bulbs cannibalize its more profitable 
incandescent bulb business.  In this sense, an incumbent firm simultaneously benefited from a new technology while 
preventing it from entering the residential lighting market for decades.  In the case of combustion turbines, 
incumbent firms were among the earliest developers of the new technology because only the incumbent firms had 
the expertise and capital to conduct large-scale R&D in turbine blade development.  Finally, in the fuel cell industry, 
development has taken place among chemical and independent companies often new to the power generation or 
automotive markets.  Most direct and incumbent rivals view fuel cells as threats, dismiss fuel cells as unviable 
alternatives, or make minor R&D investments to hedge their bets and diversify. 
 
Table 1 also suggests a common need among emerging energy technologies for continued technological 
improvement and cost reduction through R&D, as well as public policies that are either favorable to the new 
technologies or detrimental to the old ones.  Until such a convergence of favorable conditions – many of which are 
not in the control of fuel cell companies – emerging technology industries must often sustain themselves through 
niche markets.  Because the adoption time for many new energy technologies spans decades, the need for successful 
niche markets becomes even more pressing.    
   
In historical context, fuel cells parallel incandescent light bulbs because they are a promising emerging 
technology based on an entirely different fuel, different technology, and different infrastructure than their 
entrenched competition.  Fuel cells also resemble fluorescent lights and combustion turbines because their early 
versions are technologically inadequate to serve major markets, but useful enough for small applications.      
 
Just as fuel cells face market entry barriers similar to their predecessors, they may have analogous paths or 
critical enablers that can help them enter markets successfully.  Incandescent light bulbs overcame their market entry 
barriers in part because proponents created small infrastructure networks – in the form of local power plants and 
electrical grids – to service the new technology.  They were also designed to woo customers by mimicking the gas 
lamps they were replacing.  The fuel cell industry can potentially imitate this by promoting hydrogen fueling 
stations and cars in small areas or with delivery fleet vehicles to demonstrate their viability.    
 
Fluorescent bulbs and combustion turbines overcame their market entry barriers by using niche markets to 
sustain R&D until economic conditions, technological improvements, and public policies converged to usher them 
into larger markets.  The fuel cell industry could imitate this pattern if their current consumers of small products are 
considered to be niches or stepping-stones towards larger markets.   Apart from the barriers, both fluorescent bulbs 
and fuel cells are affected by enablers.  Just as policy changes were a factor that helped fluorescent bulbs overcome 
entry barriers, growing environmental concerns may act as an enabler for fuel cells to expand in the energy market.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The success of the fuel cell industry may lie in its ability to learn lessons from its predecessors.  This study 
demonstrates that fuel cell and hydrogen-based or fuel cell economies may be viable if several key challenges can be 
overcome as they were for previous energy industry success stories.  Strategies include either conforming to or 
establishing necessary infrastructure networks, finding niche markets until technologies are proven, and achieving 
competitiveness through both cost reduction and favorable public policies.  
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